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ABSTRACT 
We look at the effect of the US Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) financial regulation on industrial innovation.  
Our theoretical framework shows it creating immediate uncertainty about its costs and future 
resolution of cost and managerial performance uncertainty.  Real option value is created for 
investment delay.  We construct a panel of patenting data and fit our model to it.  We find a dip in 
patenting after SOX and subsequent medium term recovery, with larger dips for small, risky, and 
new companies.  In the medium term, these companies continue to have relatively lower patenting.  
Like SOX, the dynamic behaviour is found only to apply to US companies.  Our results have 
implications for policy and analysis. 
 
Keywords 
Innovation 
Patents 
Sarbanes-Oxley 
Regulation 
Real options 
 
                                                 
* Tel. +44 (0)115 846 6051. 
  E-mail address: james.waters@nottingham.ac.uk 
 1. Introduction 
Following the Enron bankruptcy and other financial scandals (Coates, 2007), the US Government 
enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (Sarbanes-Oxley (2002), hereafter SOX) in 2002.  The Act aims to 
protect investors by improving the quality of information disclosed by companies publicly quoted 
in the US.  It set up a body to oversee the auditing of public companies, it increased restrictions on 
the activities of auditors, company insiders, and analysts, it expanded disclosure requirements, and 
it increased penalties for malfeasance.   
 
SOX is costly for companies through direct charges and compliance costs.  Direct charges are 
incurred through levies to fund the auditing oversight body.  Compliance costs are incurred by 
hiring auditors and officers able to implement the regulations and bear the risk of increased 
punishment, and through allocation of time to meet the extended internal review and disclosure 
requirements.  These costs will ultimately be carried by investors in the companies.  On the other 
hand, SOX offers a number of benefits to investors.  They receive better information and so can 
make more informed decisions with lower uncertainty.  Plausibly, corporate insiders and auditors 
will change their behaviour to avoid illegal behaviour, so reducing risk as well as revealing it.   
 
Prior work has examined the net effects of SOX on various measures of corporate activity and 
performance, including profitability (Ahmed, 2010; Li et al, 2008; Zhang 2007) and choice of 
executives and their compensation (Cohen, 2013; Linck, 2009).  Some papers have identified a 
shift against investment and related measures in the years immediately after SOX.  For instance, 
Bargeron et al (2010) find that capital expenditures and research and development spending fell, 
Cohen et al (2013) determine that some types of risky expenditures decreased, and in Kang et al 
(2010) investment discount rates are found to have increased. 
 
This paper looks at changes in innovation outputs after SOX.  We examine whether the declines in 
industrial inputs indicated in the literature translate to declines in outputs.  A focus is the dynamics 
of the changes, and how short term and medium term changes differ. 
 
We start by giving a theoretical model of how investors respond to SOX’s passage.  SOX’s effect is 
on investor costs and uncertainty.  The costs arise through SOX’s direct charges, and through risk 
costs.  SOX creates uncertainty in the level of costs and resolves uncertainty relating to managerial 
competence.  The cost uncertainty and the managerial uncertainty both decline over the period of 
SOX’s implementation.  The uncertainty decline creates a real option value of waiting to invest. 
 
We use the model to deduce hypotheses on investor behaviour before SOX, in the short run after it, 
and in the medium term.  The model implies that investment in small, risky, and new companies 
will decline immediately after SOX, and then rise in the medium term.  The finding is specific to 
investment in US public companies, and investment in non-US companies should not exhibit such a 
fall and rise.  The persistent effect of SOX is not determined in the model and is left for empirical 
determination. 
 
Testing of the hypotheses then follows.  We use US patent data as a measure of industrial output 
following long precedent in the literature (Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 2002).  A panel of patents is 
constructed, with industrial classes as the cross-section and monthly patenting in the time 
dimension.  Statistics on class size, risk, and newness are derived and included.  The model’s 
estimating equations describe patents driven by common time trends and industrial class dummies 
with parameter breaks immediately after SOX and then in the medium term, where the size of the 
breaks depend on class characteristics.  The equations are fitted under panel negative binomial 
stochastic assumptions, with both fixed and random effects. 
 
We find that our model’s predictions hold.  With various degrees of significance, small, risky, and 
new classes (and by extension, companies) experience patent declines immediately after SOX, and 
then recover in the medium term.  The behaviour is not replicated by non-US companies, indicating 
a US specific cause like SOX. 
 
We make a number of contributions to analysis of SOX.  Our theoretical contribution is in 
representing the Act in terms of its effect on uncertainty and the creation of real option value for 
investment delay.  We provide a theoretical connection between the prior SOX empirical work on 
investment rates (Bargeron et al, 2010; Cohen et al, 2013; Kang et al, 2010), on information 
revelation and improved investment practice (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al, 2009; Cheng et al, 2013; 
Kalelkar and Nwaeze, 2011; Singer and You, 2011), and risk dynamics (Akhigbe and Martin, 2008; 
Akhigbe et al, 2008). 
 
An empirical contribution is to demonstrate the existence of a temporary dip in SOX response and 
subsequent recovery, consistent with our theory.  Previous empirical work has generally examined 
the post-SOX period as subject to a common generating function, rather than subject to variation 
(Ahmed et al, 2010; Kang et al, 2010; Leuz et al, 2008; Linck et al, 2009).  We further find an 
industrial output change attributable to SOX.  Existing work has examined changes in industrial 
inputs (Bargeron et al, 2010; Cohen et al, 2013), or looked at financial quantities like profit 
(Ahmed, 2010; Li et al, 2008).  We supplement the literature on SOX’s effect on these variables by 
demonstrating that there is a medium term reduction in patenting following SOX. 
 
A more general contribution is to the literature on the effect of finance on innovative outcomes.  
General frameworks for looking at finance’s effect on innovation are given in Hall (2002), and the 
effect of financial crises on innovation is given in Paunov (2012) and Archibugi (2013).  We are 
not aware of any precursors in the literature looking at financial regulation’s effect on innovative 
outputs. 
 
Section 2 presents our theoretical model, section 3 describes the data, section 4 has our estimation 
method, section 5 presents results, and section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Theoretical framework 
In this section we describe the options faced by an investor who can invest in a project leading to 
innovation.  Their investment criteria are given prior to SOX, immediately following its 
introduction, and in the long run.  After solving the criteria, we use them to formulate a testable 
hypothesis and a means of inferring SOX’s persistent effect. 
 
An investor is profit maximising and earns income from investing in a company and receiving 
profits from their investment.  They discount future income at a rate d.  The investor is risk averse 
and incurs costs of KR when they receive a random income drawn from distribution function R; this 
cost may arise from extra capital being advanced to protect against loss exposure and so not being 
available for higher yielding projects elsewhere.  When R is concentrated at a single point, KR = 0.  
Investors have funds available for immediate investment in the company, or can choose to delay for 
m time periods and then reassess their options. 
 
The company requires investment of C.  If the company receives the investment, it is spent on an 
innovative project that is non-reversible and there are no resale opportunities at a value above the 
investment return.  Innovation results in intellectual property and a one-off income from it of rt.  
Because of difficulties in observing the company’s managerial quality, the investor perceives rt as 
unknown prior to investment and treats it as a random variable drawn from a distribution Rt.  The 
company protects its intellectual property by patenting, with the number of patents increasing in rt. 
 
Prior to SOX, the distribution Rt is unchanging over time, so R0 = Rm.  When SOX is introduced, 
the income generated after investment decreases by a one-off cost of st.  We call this extra term 
“cost” by reference to the additional auditing and other expenses incurred through SOX, but it may 
be negative and so increase the investor’s income if the changes improve the ongoing performance 
of the company.  Investors are initially unsure about the size of st, and treat it as drawn from a 
distribution St.  They have assumptions about how they will update their prior distribution of the 
effect as information emerges over time.  Companies anticipate that they will have sufficient 
information to form stable judgements of SOX's effect by time m, so that the support for Sm will be 
a single point within the support for S0.  We denote by Qt the distribution of the sum qt = rt – st. 
 
Before SOX’s introduction, the investor loses from delay in making their investment decision or 
not.  The distribution function of returns is stable over time, so the same undiscounted expected 
return will be earned from immediate or delayed investment, and the latter return is subject to 
discounting.  So investment will be made if and only if the expected returns from immediate 
investment net of risk costs are positive, or 
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where I(R0) is the support of R0 and e1 is an error term with distribution function F.  The 
probability of (immediate) investment is thus 
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Immediately after SOX’s introduction, the returns from investment change over time so a choice 
not to invest immediately does not imply a permanent commitment.  Thus, investors choose 
whether to invest straightaway or delay for $m$ periods until they are fully informed about SOX 
costs and managerial quality.  Delay occurs if and only if 
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where I(Q0) is the support of Q0, }0:)({)( 0 >∈=+ qQIqQI , and e2 is an error term. 
 
The left hand side is the expected value from immediate investment, and the right hand side is the 
expected value from waiting and only investing if the revealed managerial quality net of costs gives 
a positive profit.  We can decompose the integral on the left hand side and rearrange to give 
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where )(\)()( 0 +=− QIQIQI , which is the set of SOX costs and managerial qualities that result in 
a loss if they occur after m periods.  If e2 has distribution function F, then the probability of 
immediate investment is 
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Comparison with the probability of immediate investment before SOX shows that whether it rises 
or falls depends on SOX and company characteristics affecting SOX’s costs, benefits, and risks.  
We consider some company features that are liable to reduce immediate investment in favour of 
delayed investment. 
 
Many papers find that SOX was more costly for small companies (Ahmed et al, 2010; 
Chhaochharia and Grinstein, 2007; Kamar et al, 2007; Kang, 2010; Litvak, 2007b; Wintoki, 2007).  
If companies have high costs, then ∫
+ )(
0
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dQq  will tend to be smaller and positive while 
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0
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dQq  will tend to be larger and negative.  The probability of immediate investment then 
declines.  Moreover, for a small company the risk compensation term )( 0QK  is likely to be more 
significant relative to other components of the expression including the error term, so the 
probability of immediate investment would also decline.  Thus we have the following hypotheses: 
 
H1a: Investment by small companies will fall immediately after SOX. 
H1b: Investment by small companies will rise in the medium term after SOX. 
 
Some research finds that SOX penalised risk-taking and was followed by shifts out of risk taking 
activities (Bargeron et al, 2010; Cohen et al, 2013).  Kang et al (2010) find that riskier firms used 
higher discount rates after SOX, consistent with increased risk aversion.  We look at how 
investment in risky companies responded dynamically after SOX, where risk is measured by 
dispersion in income.  If the dispersion in q increases, then ∫
+ )(
0
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0
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magnitude by the same amount since any extra expected profits will be offset by extra expected 
losses.  Thus, their net contribution to the probability of immediate investment is unchanged.  The 
risk compensation term )( 0QK  will rise.  We can rewrite the probability as  
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where the first two terms in the distribution function make no net contribution, while the last two 
terms become more positive.  Thus, the probability of immediate investment declines.  Intuitively, 
the extra risk increases the value of waiting to see and the risk disutility of immediate investment.  
Hypotheses H3 and H4 follow: 
 
H2a: Investment by risky companies will fall immediately after SOX. 
H2b: Investment by risky companies will rise in the medium term after SOX. 
 
Wintoki (2007) determines that newer companies had lower abnormal returns during the passage of 
SOX than older companies.  New companies may be both smaller and riskier than average, and so 
their response will reflect these characteristics.  For our model, their patenting will tend to fall and 
rise after SOX.  A further dynamic is introduced by the information revelation associated with 
investors and regulators learning about a new company from experience.  When a new company 
undertakes an investment project and is immediately subject to SOX, lack of publicly available 
information will likely make disclosure about the project more onerous and costly.  Instead, the 
new company could avoid immediate investment and allow information about itself to emerge at a 
lower cost through continued operations.  We represent the lower cost by a reduction of c to the 
disclosure cost st, so that the revenue from waiting is )( csrcq ttt −−=+ .  The revised delay 
criterion is 
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with probability of immediate investment given by 
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The expression in the distribution function differs by the positive term ∫
++ )( 0
)
)1( QIm
dQ
d
c
, so the 
probability of immediate investment declines.  The intuitive reason is that immediate investment 
incurs a disclosure cost through SOX that is not required for actual disclosure, so is more costly 
relative to waiting.  Hence we have 
 
H3a: Investment by new companies will fall immediately after SOX. 
H3b: Investment by new companies will rise in the medium term after SOX. 
 
SOX applies only to companies publicly quoted in the US.  We would therefore not expect to see 
all of the behaviours proposed in hypotheses H1-3 exhibited by other innovative organisations if 
SOX is their cause.  In particular, non-US residents would not be directly affected by SOX, 
although they may be indirectly affected, for example if they sell to US public companies.  The 
following hypothesis captures our expectations: 
 
H4: Investment in non-US residents will not exhibit all the behaviours proposed in hypotheses H1-
3.  
 
After m periods, investors are aware of SOX’s costs and managerial quality and face no further 
uncertainty.  They therefore face a problem of investing if and only if rm – sm > 0 where rm and sm 
are realisations from the returns distribution R0 and the SOX cost distribution S0 respectively. 
 
Comparing with the investment criterion before SOX given in inequality (1), we see that the 
expected long run value of investment will increase if and only if 
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which says that the observed returns net of the observed SOX costs exceed the expected returns net 
of the risk premium.  Generally the left hand side and right hand side will differ in value, and SOX 
will induce a persistent change in investment and innovation.  At the time of SOX’s 
implementation the two left hand values will not be known, and their expected values can be taken 
to determine whether SOX is expected to increase investment.  Putting the error term as zero mean 
and taking expectations, cancelling out the terms for expected returns, and rearranging, we have 
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where I(S0) is the support of S0. 
 
So SOX is expected to increase investment if and only if the risk premium from ignorance about 
managerial quality (which vanishes after SOX) exceeds the expected SOX costs (which appear 
after SOX).  If investors are not risk averse and SOX is expected to be costly, then the left hand 
side will be zero and the right hand side will be positive, so the value of investment will tend to fall 
after SOX. 
 
There is evidence in the literature on the types of company which have large costs relative to their 
size.  Many papers find that small companies are disproportionately burdened (for example, Ahmed 
et al (2010)) and Wintoki (2007) indicates that new companies are too.  Some papers find that 
companies were avoiding risky behaviour (for example, Bargeron et al (2010)), consistent with 
lower net income from it.  On the other hand, investors may be expected to be relatively ignorant 
about managerial quality at small, new, and risky companies or such companies may be particularly 
susceptible to internal control weaknesses (Doyle, 2007), and so investors would benefit 
disproportionately from disclosure about them.  Research indicates that investment allocation does 
respond to SOX disclosures (Cheng, 2013; Singer and You, 2011). 
 
Given SOX’s ambiguous persistent effects, we test the following competing hypotheses: 
 
H5a: Investment by small, risky, and new companies will fall in the medium term after SOX 
relative to the pre-SOX period. 
H5b: Investment by small, risky, and new companies will rise in the medium term after SOX 
relative to the pre-SOX period. 
 
3. Empirical procedure 
Our theoretical model looks at innovative investment in companies.  We will test its hypotheses 
using aggregated output data.  To connect the model with the data, we make the assumption that 
aggregate characteristics reflect the characteristics of the individual input investments.  Thus, if the 
individual investments are small and volatile, the aggregate output will also tend to be small and 
volatile and vice versa.  Similarly, if component investments undergo a change in behaviour, then 
the change will be manifested in aggregate output and vice versa.  We perform aggregation to the 
level of industrial sector, and provide more detail in Section 4 on data. 
 
Patents are used as our measure of outputs of industrial innovation, for which there is long 
precedent (Hausman et al, 1984; Hall et al, 1986; Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 2002).  The expected level 
of patenting has an unobserved, class specific component and a common time trend.  The time 
trend will not capture different long term trends across industries, but will describe more short term 
drifts such as that due to broad business cycles.  The formula for expected patents yi,t in class i at 
time t is then assumed to be given by )lnexp( , itixt δβα ++  where α is a constant, t is time, β is a 
vector of parameters, xi,t is a vector of class and time specific variables, and δi is a class specific 
positive constant. 
 
Our theoretical model indicates that there is a change in patenting immediately after SOX and then 
in the medium term.  Moreover, the change is affected by company size, risk, and age.  We infer 
aggregate changes are induced by the characteristics of the industrial sectors in which the 
companies patent.  Two possible changes are considered, in the level of patenting and in its trend.  
βxi,t in the former case is given by )( 3210, newrisksizedx ti βββββ +++×=  where d is a dummy 
equal to one for the change period and zero otherwise, the βjs are constants, size is the size of the 
industrial sector, risk is the risk in the sector, and new measures its newness.  For the trend change, 
βxi,t is given by )( 3210, newrisksizetdx ti βββββ +++××= .  Our estimations compare patenting 
before SOX with patenting immediately after it, then patenting immediately after it with the 
medium term, then patenting before SOX with the medium term.  In each case the later period has 
the time dummy d equal to one. 
 
The stochastic distribution of patenting in each class is assumed to be negative binomial following 
the NB1 specification so the variance is proportional to the mean.  The probability of yi,t patents 
occurring in class i and time t is then 
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where )exp( ,, titi xt βαλ += .  We consider both fixed effects and random effects models.  In the 
former, the δi are unknown deterministic parameters, while in the latter they are independent, 
identically distributed, random variables with ),(~)1/(1 21 ppBetaiδ+  for unknown deterministic 
parameters p1 and p2.  The observed patent data is estimated as a panel across class and time using 
maximum likelihood estimation (Hausman et al, 1984; Cameron and Trivedi, 1998, ch. 9).  The 
estimations are implemented in STATA code forthcoming on the author’s website. 
 
4. Data 
We test our hypotheses on US patent data.  Our source for the data and supporting material is the 
US Patent and Trademark Organization (USPTO) website at www.uspto.gov.  The data was 
extracted in July and August 2013.  We use the patent data as the output and to derive determinant 
statistics.  Other data from the website is used as a source of determinant variables. 
 
4.1 Innovation 
Patent data at the USPTO is multiply subdivided.  The divisions include the record type 
(application, publication of application, or issue), date of event, industrial patent class, the country 
of residence of the applicant, and the name of the assignee.  We examine applications made 
between April 2001 and December 2007 and aggregate the data by the application month.  The data 
is grouped by patent class.  There are 473 classes recorded by the USPTO, and we randomly select 
67 of them.  The selection is done to make data collection more manageable.  The classes are 
shown in Appendix 1, Table A1.  We split the data depending on whether the patenter’s country of 
residence is the US or not.  
 4.2 Size 
The size of the patent class is measured by the mean number of monthly patents applied for in the 
class between April 2001 and March 2002.  The statistics are calculated for US and non-US 
residents’ patents.  The country means are shown by patent class in Appendix 1, Table A2.  There 
is quite a wide variation in the mean numbers by class, from 283.5 per month (US residents) and 
120.3 (non-US residents) in the data processing class 707 down to zero per month for the smokers’ 
supplies class D27.  The between class standard deviation in the within class means is 44.6 (US) 
and 19.5 (non-US). 
 
4.3 Risk 
Patent class risk is measured by the standard deviation of monthly patent applications in the class 
between April 2001 and March 2002.  The risk is calculated for the US and non-US data.  
Appendix 1, Table A2 shows the standard deviations by patent class.  The maximum standard 
deviation for US residents is 41.6 while for non-US residents it is 12.4, with zero minima. 
 
4.4 ewness 
We use the patent class establishment date to measure class newness.  The establishment date is 
available directly from the USPTO website, and is shown in Appendix 1, Table A2.  It is 
moderately correlated with the other determinants, US patent mean (0.31), US standard deviation 
(0.29), non-US patent mean (0.29), and non-US standard deviation (0.24).  Thus, there is some 
tendency for newer classes to be larger and more volatile. 
 
4.5 Timing for SOX’s effects 
We have to decide on the dates to allocate to the pre-SOX period, the period immediately after, and 
the medium term.  Patent application data is only published by the USPTO website from March 
2001, and the financial crisis of 2008-9 plausibly affected innovation investment (Paunov, 2012).  
Thus, between these natural breaks we have seven years to allocate to the three periods. 
 
SOX was signed into law on July 30th 2002 following a legislative procedure that had started at the 
beginning of the year (Chhaochharia and Grinstein, 2007; Litvak, 2007a).  The implementation of 
its measures was staggered over the next decade, with longer delays for small firms (Gao et al, 
2009).  The expectation of SOX linked costs may have reasonably arisen from early 2002 with 
actual implementation costs from the middle of the year onwards, depending on the firm size. 
 Patents measure new investment with a lag to allow for product development, so the full effect of 
SOX on patenting would be expected to act with a delay (Griffin (1997) reports average product 
development cycle times of 15.3 months across five industries when development systems are in 
place).  Some early impact may be expected as patents emerge during the development process.  
Moreover, the act of patenting is in itself costly as it reveals the existence of an innovation and part 
of its process to the market, so would be sensitive to operating conditions and hence SOX.  But the 
major effect would plausibly not be instantaneous.  Taking into account the date of SOX’s signing 
and implementation and the delays in investment output response, we take the years 2001-2 as the 
pre-SOX period for patenting.  We omit the year 2003 from our analysis as it is difficult to classify 
patents emerging then as broadly belonging to investment from the pre-SOX or immediate post-
SOX era. 
 
We take January 2004 as marking the start of the immediate post-SOX period.  The theoretical 
model characterises this period as being one of corporate uncertainty, so to find a suitable end point 
we look for evidence from the literature on when uncertainty substantially reduced.  Public and 
private measures to increase information and certainty were undertaken from SOX’s inception 
(Prentice and Spence, 2007, p.54).  However, the Securities and Exchange Commission’s 
interpretative guidance on internal controls was only issued in 2007 (Kamar et al, 2007), and 
industry bodies reported uncertainty about implementation at that time (Biotechnology Industry 
Organization, 2007b).  Hartman (2007) quantifies the level of SOX costs and corporate ability to 
predict them from 2001 to 2006, using raw financial data and a survey of firms.  Audit costs and 
the general costs of being a public company stabilise after 2004 for both large and small businesses.  
The percentage of senior corporate directors and officers who reported being better able to predict 
SOX costs rose from 38 percent in 2004 to 66 percent in 2006.  On balance, we take the end of 
2005 as the end of the immediate post-SOX period of highest uncertainty, and thus consider 2006 
and 2007 as the medium term after SOX. 
 
5. Results 
5.1 Changes in patenting by US patenters 
We start the presentation of results by looking at patenting by US residents before and after SOX.  
The tables show random effects estimates in their first section and fixed effects estimates in their 
second section.  As the estimates are very similar, we only comment on the former. 
 
5.1.1 Changes in patenting immediately after SOX for US patenters 
Table 1a: Patenting and coefficient shifts for time-invariant variables between 2001/2 and 2004/5 - 
random effects estimates 
 1 2 3 4 
Time 0.00443*** 0.00446*** 0.00454*** 0.00452*** 
 0.00103 0.00103 0.00101 0.00101 
D 0.0815** 0.0878** 5.85*** 5.74*** 
 0.0382 0.0438 0.936 0.94 
D * mean  0.00362*** 0.00144*** 0.00372*** 
  0.00112 0.000214 0.00112 
D * s.d.  -0.0214**  -0.0172** 
  0.00833  0.00829 
D * date estd.   -0.00298*** -0.00291*** 
   0.00048 0.000483 
The dependent variable is the number of patents.  D is the later period dummy.  Standard errors are 
shown below the coefficients.  * denotes significance at ten percent, ** at five percent, and *** at 
one percent. 
 
Table 1b: Patenting and coefficient shifts for time-invariant variables between 2001/2 and 2004/5 – 
fixed effects estimates 
 1 2 3 4 
Time 0.00443*** 0.00446*** 0.00454*** 0.00451*** 
 0.00104 0.00103 0.00101 0.00101 
D 0.0815** 0.0909** 5.85*** 5.74*** 
 0.0382 0.0439 0.938 0.942 
D * mean  0.0037*** 0.00142*** 0.0038*** 
  0.00113 0.000215 0.00112 
D * s.d.  -0.0222***  -0.0179** 
  0.00835  0.00831 
D * date estd.   -0.00298*** -0.00291*** 
   0.000481 0.000484 
The dependent variable is the number of patents.  D is the later period dummy.  Standard errors are 
shown below the coefficients.  * denotes significance at ten percent, ** at five percent, and *** at 
one percent. 
 
Table 1a shows the estimated coefficients allowing for changes immediately after SOX in 
coefficients on time-invariant variables.  The first column shows that there was a general tendency 
for patenting to increase within groups over time.  Immediately after SOX, there was a level shift 
upwards in the patent rate.  The shift is significant at five percent.  Column two includes the post-
SOX dummy interacted with the mean of the number of early patents and the standard deviation.  
Classes with larger mean numbers of early patents have a greater upwards shift, while greater 
standard deviation of patenting is associated with a lower shift.  The coefficients are significant at 
one percent and five percent respectively.  Column three shows the model with post-SOX 
interaction with the patent mean and the year the patent class was established.  The patenting 
increase is again greater for larger classes.  Newer classes have a lower shift.  The coefficients on 
both are highly significant.  The fourth column has mean, standard deviation, and establishment 
date interactions.  Again, the patenting increase after SOX is greater for bigger classes.  Increased 
standard deviation of early patenting and later class introduction both are associated with reduced 
patenting.  The coefficients are all significant, at one, five, and one percent respectively. 
 
Table 2a: Patenting and coefficient shifts for trends between 2001/2 and 2004/5 – random effects 
estimates 
 1 2 3 4 
Time 0.0014 0.00139 0.00141 0.0014 
 0.00166 0.00166 0.00163 0.00163 
D * time 0.00412*** 0.00404*** 0.122*** 0.12*** 
 0.00132 0.00139 0.0199 0.02 
D * mean * time  0.0000657*** 0.0000309*** 0.0000682*** 
  0.0000239 0.00000455 0.0000238 
D * s.d. * time  -0.000366**  -0.000281 
  0.000177  0.000176 
D * date estd. * time   -0.0000608*** -0.0000597*** 
   0.0000102 0.0000103 
The dependent variable is the number of patents.  D is the later period dummy.  Standard errors are 
shown below the coefficients.  * denotes significance at ten percent, ** at five percent, and *** at 
one percent. 
 
Table 2b: Patenting and coefficient shifts for trends between 2001/2 and 2004/5 – fixed effects 
estimates 
 1 2 3 4 
Time 0.0014 0.00139 0.00141 0.00139 
 0.00167 0.00166 0.00164 0.00164 
D * time 0.00412*** 0.0041*** 0.122*** 0.12*** 
 0.00132 0.00139 0.02 0.02 
D * mean * time  0.0000675*** 0.0000305*** 0.0000699*** 
  0.000024 0.00000457 0.0000239 
D * s.d. * time  -0.000382**  -0.000297* 
  0.000178  0.000177 
D * date estd. * time   -0.0000608*** -0.0000596*** 
   0.0000102 0.0000103 
The dependent variable is the number of patents.  D is the later period dummy.  Standard errors are 
shown below the coefficients.  * denotes significance at ten percent, ** at five percent, and *** at 
one percent. 
 
In Table 2a we see coefficient shifts for trend terms after the introduction of SOX.  The first 
column looks at a time trend and a change in the trend after SOX’s introduction.  There is a positive 
but insignificant time trend.  The time trend after SOX’s introduction is positive and highly 
significant.  Column two includes the post-SOX time trend interacted with the mean and standard 
deviation of early patents in the class.  Classes with more early patents had a greater trend increase 
after SOX, while classes with more volatility had a lower increase.  The former effect is one 
percent significant, and the latter is five percent significant.  Column three interacts the post-SOX 
trend with the mean and the year of class establishment.  Classes with higher patent mean have a 
greater trend increase, while later established classes have lower increase.  Both effects are one 
percent significant.  In column four, the post-SOX trend change is interacted with the class mean, 
standard deviation, and establishment date.  The mean increases the trend change at one percent 
significance.  The standard deviation decreases the trend change but is insignificant, while the 
establishment date decreases it with a significance of one percent. 
 
In summary, there is evidence from estimates from Tables 1 and 2 of shifts in the level and trend of 
patenting following SOX.  The average effect was an increase in the patenting rate, and the increase 
was greater in classes with many patents.  It was smaller for more volatile and newer classes.  We 
find evidence hypotheses H1a, H2a, and H3a, that a downward shift would be expected after SOX 
for smaller, newer, and riskier companies patenting in classes more exposed to uncertainty. 
 5.1.2 Changes in patenting in the medium term after SOX for US patenters 
Table 3a shows how the effect of time-invariant factors on patenting changes between the 
immediate period after SOX (2004/5) and the medium term (2006/7).  The first column has a time 
trend and dummy for the 2006/7 period as determinants.  The trend is positive and highly 
significant.  There is a fall in the level of patenting within groups in the second period which is 
significant at five percent.  Column two includes dummy interactions with the early patent mean 
and standard deviation.  Classes with larger numbers of patents had a larger decline in patenting in 
the second period, while classes with greater standard deviation had a reduced decline.  The third 
column has dummy interactions with the class mean and establishment date.  The mean interaction 
has an entirely insignificant effect.  Classes established later have a smaller patent decline in 2006/7, 
and the effect is highly significant.  The fourth column has dummy interactions with the mean, 
standard deviation, and establishment date.  The mean makes the patenting reduction larger while 
the standard deviation makes it smaller.  Neither interaction is significant.  Later establishment 
dates make the patenting reduction smaller, and is five percent significant. 
 
Table 3a: Patenting and coefficient shifts for time-invariant variables between 2004/5 and 2006/7 – 
random effects estimates 
 1 2 3 4 
Time 0.00773*** 0.00772*** 0.00772*** 0.00773*** 
 0.000948 0.000945 0.000944 0.000942 
D -0.0563** -0.098*** -1.92** -1.85** 
 0.0263 0.0332 0.878 0.877 
D * mean  -0.00137 0.0000657 -0.00141 
  0.00114 0.000219 0.00113 
D * s.d.  0.0124  0.0111 
  0.00837  0.00833 
D * date estd.   0.000951** 0.000904** 
   0.000451 0.000451 
The dependent variable is the number of patents.  D is the later period dummy.  Standard errors are 
shown below the coefficients.  * denotes significance at ten percent, ** at five percent, and *** at 
one percent. 
Table 3b: Patenting and coefficient shifts for time-invariant variables between 2004/5 and 2006/7 - 
fixed effects estimates 
 1 2 3 4 
Time 0.00773*** 0.00772*** 0.00773*** 0.00773*** 
 0.000949 0.000947 0.000945 0.000944 
D -0.0563** -0.0958*** -1.93** -1.87** 
 0.0263 0.0333 0.879 0.878 
D * mean  -0.00129 0.000047 -0.00134 
  0.00114 0.00022 0.00113 
D * s.d.  0.0118  0.0104 
  0.00839  0.00835 
D * date estd.   0.000956** 0.000911** 
   0.000452 0.000452 
The dependent variable is the number of patents.  D is the later period dummy.  Standard errors are 
shown below the coefficients.  * denotes significance at ten percent, ** at five percent, and *** at 
one percent. 
 
We see in Table 4a how patenting trends changed between 2004/5 and 2006/7.  In column one, the 
determinant variables are time and time interacted with a 2006/7 dummy.  The time trend is 
positive and highly significant.  The trend reduces in the second period, and the reduction is 
significant at ten percent.  Column two has interactions of the mean and standard deviation with the 
2006/7 time trend change.  The mean decreases the trend and higher standard deviation increases it, 
but the effects are insignificant.  In column three the class establishment date is introduced beside 
the mean as an interaction with the trend change.  The mean interaction has an entirely insignificant 
effect.  Later class establishment date increases the trend change with five percent significance.  
The fourth column has the trend change interacted with the mean, standard deviation, and 
establishment date.  The mean increases the change, the standard deviation reduces it, and neither is 
significant.  The establishment date increases the trend with ten percent significance. 
 
Table 4a: Patenting and coefficient shifts for trends between 2004/5 and 2006/7 – random effects 
estimates 
 1 2 3 4 
Time 0.00773*** 0.00772*** 0.00772*** 0.00772*** 
 0.00114 0.00113 0.00113 0.00113 
D * time -0.00076* -0.00131** -0.0261** -0.0252** 
 0.000446 0.000531 0.0124 0.0124 
D * mean * time  -0.00002 0.000000283 -0.0000207 
  0.0000161 0.00000311 0.000016 
D * s.d. * time  0.000176  0.000158 
  0.000119  0.000118 
D * date estd. * time   0.0000129** 0.0000123* 
   0.00000639 0.00000638 
The dependent variable is the number of patents.  D is the later period dummy.  Standard errors are 
shown below the coefficients.  * denotes significance at ten percent, ** at five percent, and *** at 
one percent. 
 
Table 4b: Patenting and coefficient shifts for trends between 2004/5 and 2006/7 – fixed effects 
estimates 
 1 2 3 4 
Time 0.00773*** 0.00772*** 0.00772*** 0.00773*** 
 0.00114 0.00114 0.00113 0.00113 
D * time -0.00076* -0.00128** -0.0262** -0.0254** 
 0.000446 0.000532 0.0125 0.0124 
D * mean * time  -0.0000189 0.0000000198 -0.0000197 
  0.0000161 0.00000312 0.000016 
D * s.d. * time  0.000166  0.000148 
  0.000119  0.000118 
D * date estd. * time   0.000013** 0.0000124* 
   0.0000064 0.00000639 
The dependent variable is the number of patents.  D is the later period dummy.  Standard errors are 
shown below the coefficients.  * denotes significance at ten percent, ** at five percent, and *** at 
one percent. 
 
To summarise the results from Tables 3 and 4, patenting fell within classes in the 2006/7 period 
relative to the immediate post-SOX period.  The decline was heterogeneous across patenting 
classes.  The decline was larger for classes with large mean and less for those with large standard 
deviation.  Classes established later declined less, and the effect was always significant.  We find 
evidence of a patenting rise in the medium term after SOX in classes that are smaller, riskier, or 
newer.  By extension to companies, we find support for hypotheses H1b, H2b, and H3b. 
 
5.1.3 Changes in patenting between the pre-SOX period and the medium term for US patenters 
We now turn to look at what SOX’s effect was once we allow to pass the temporary change in 
patenting that followed it.  Table 5a looks at the shifts in the effect of time invariant variables on 
patenting between the pre-SOX period (2001/2) and the medium term (2006/7).  The first column 
has a time trend and a 2006/7 dummy variable only.  The time trend is significant.  There is a 
decline in the level of patenting in the later period, but it is not significant.  The second column 
introduces the early patent mean and standard deviation interaction with the dummy.  The dummy 
again has a negative, insignificant effect.  Larger patent classes have a smaller reduction in their 
patenting level, and the effect is five percent significant.  More volatile classes have a larger decline 
between the two periods, but without significance.  In column three, the mean and class 
introduction date interact with the dummy.  The post-SOX dummy becomes positive and highly 
significant.  Larger classes have a greater increase and more volatile classes have a smaller increase, 
both at one percent significance.  The fourth column includes the dummy interacted with patent 
standard deviation.  The mean interaction is positive and five percent significant, while the standard 
deviation interaction is negative and insignificant.  Newer classes have reduced patenting, with one 
percent significance. 
 
Table 5a: Patenting and coefficient shifts for time-invariant variables between 2001/2 and 2006/7 – 
random effects estimates 
 1 2 3 4 
Time 0.00651*** 0.00645*** 0.00643*** 0.00643*** 
 0.00111 0.0011 0.0011 0.0011 
D -0.0276 -0.0461 3.85*** 3.8*** 
 0.0665 0.0699 1.02 1.02 
D * mean  0.00267** 0.00151*** 0.00276** 
  0.00126 0.000245 0.00127 
D * s.d.  -0.0123  -0.00942 
  0.00927  0.00935 
D * date estd.   -0.00202*** -0.00198*** 
   0.000523 0.000525 
The dependent variable is the number of patents.  D is the later period dummy.  Standard errors are 
shown below the coefficients.  * denotes significance at ten percent, ** at five percent, and *** at 
one percent. 
 
Table 5b: Patenting and coefficient shifts for time-invariant variables between 2001/2 and 2006/7 – 
fixed effects estimates 
 1 2 3 4 
Time 0.00651*** 0.00645*** 0.00643*** 0.00643*** 
 0.00111 0.0011 0.0011 0.0011 
D -0.0278 -0.0427 3.85*** 3.79*** 
 0.0666 0.07 1.02 1.03 
D * mean  0.00279** 0.00148*** 0.00288** 
  0.00126 0.000246 0.00127 
D * s.d.  -0.0134  -0.0105 
  0.0093  0.00938 
D * date estd.   -0.00202*** -0.00197*** 
   0.000524 0.000527 
The dependent variable is the number of patents.  D is the later period dummy.  Standard errors are 
shown below the coefficients.  * denotes significance at ten percent, ** at five percent, and *** at 
one percent. 
 
Table 6a looks at changes in patenting trends and their determinants between 2001/2 and 2006/7.  
Column one has a time trend and a dummy for a trend change in 2006/7.  The time trend is positive 
but not significant in 2001/2.  In the later period the trend is positive and significant at five percent.  
The second column includes trend change interacted with early patent means and standard 
deviations.  The trend change remains positive and ten percent significant.  Larger classes have a 
higher trend change, while more volatile classes have a lower change.  The former effect is 
significant at five percent, while the latter isn’t significant.  The third column has trend change 
interactions with the patent mean and establishment date.  The time trend change in 2006/7 is 
positive and highly significant.  The trend change increases for larger classes but is smaller for 
riskier ones.  Both interactions are significant at one percent.  In column four, we see interactions 
between the trend change dummy and the patent mean, the standard deviation, and the 
establishment date.  The trend change coefficient is positive and one percent significant, its mean 
interaction is positive and five percent significant, and its standard deviation interaction is negative 
and insignificant.  Later established classes have a lower, highly significant trend change. 
 
Table 6a: Patenting and coefficient shifts for trends between 2001/2 and 2006/7 – random effects 
estimates 
 1 2 3 4 
Time 0.00205 0.00201 0.00199 0.00199 
 0.00189 0.00189 0.00188 0.00189 
D * time 0.00345** 0.00321* 0.0591*** 0.0584*** 
 0.00161 0.00164 0.0145 0.0145 
D * mean * time  0.0000363** 0.0000204*** 0.0000379** 
  0.0000178 0.00000347 0.0000179 
D * s.d. * time  -0.00017  -0.000132 
  0.000131  0.000132 
D * date estd. * time   -0.0000289*** -0.0000284*** 
   0.00000739 0.00000742 
The dependent variable is the number of patents.  D is the later period dummy.  Standard errors are 
shown below the coefficients.  * denotes significance at ten percent, ** at five percent, and *** at 
one percent. 
 
Table 6b: Patenting and coefficient shifts for trends between 2001/2 and 2006/7 – fixed effects 
estimates 
 1 2 3 4 
Time 0.00204 0.002 0.00199 0.00199 
 0.0019 0.00189 0.00189 0.00189 
D * time 0.00345** 0.00326** 0.059*** 0.0583*** 
 0.00162 0.00165 0.0145 0.0146 
D * mean * time  0.000038** 0.00002*** 0.0000397** 
  0.0000178 0.00000348 0.000018 
D * s.d. * time  -0.000186  -0.000148 
  0.000131  0.000133 
D * date estd. * time   -0.0000289*** -0.0000283*** 
   0.00000741 0.00000744 
The dependent variable is the number of patents.  D is the later period dummy.  Standard errors are 
shown below the coefficients.  * denotes significance at ten percent, ** at five percent, and *** at 
one percent. 
 
The findings from tables 5 and 6 shows that there was a patenting increase within patent classes in 
2006/7 relative to 2001/2.  An increase in patenting between the two periods is greater for large 
classes and smaller for newer classes.  There is less significant evidence that riskier classes had 
lower patenting increases.  By extending the results to companies operating in the classes, we find 
evidence supporting hypothesis H5a that smaller, newer, and riskier companies patented less in the 
medium term after SOX’s passage, and evidence against H5b. 
 
5.2 Changes in patenting by non-US patenters 
In this section we examine patenting by non-US resident patenters following SOX’s passage.  
Fixed effects models had difficulties in numerical convergence, so we report only random effects 
estimates.  As noted in section 5.1, for the US patenters the fixed and random effect estimates were 
very close. 
 
5.2.1 Changes in patenting immediately after SOX for non-US patenters 
Table 7 shows changes in the effect of time-invariant influences on patenting between 2001/2 and 
2004/5.  The first column has only a time trend and a level dummy for the 2004/5 period.  The 
dummy has a positive effect and is highly significant.  The second column has the dummy 
interacted with the early patent mean and standard deviation.  Larger classes benefit more in the 
later period, while more volatile classes benefit less.  Both relations are one percent significant.  
The third column interacts the dummy with the mean and class establishment date.  Larger classes 
have higher patenting with one percent significance.  The establishment date is not significant.  In 
column four, the mean, standard deviation, and establishment date are interacted.  The mean has a 
positive effect on patenting, the standard deviation has a negative effect, and both are one percent 
significant.  The establishment date is entirely insignificant. 
 
Table 7: Patenting and coefficient shifts for time-invariant variables between 2001/2 and 2004/5 – 
random effects estimates 
 1 2 3 4 
Time 0.00369*** 0.00379*** 0.00372*** 0.00379*** 
 0.00106 0.00106 0.00106 0.00106 
D 0.402*** 0.472*** 0.852 0.595 
 0.0399 0.0498 1.02 1.03 
D * mean  0.00538*** 0.00187*** 0.0054*** 
  0.00099 0.00059 0.00101 
D * s.d.  -0.0401***  -0.04*** 
  0.00936  0.0094 
D * date estd.   -0.000255 -0.0000635 
   0.000527 0.000529 
The dependent variable is the number of patents.  D is the later period dummy.  Standard errors are 
shown below the coefficients.  * denotes significance at ten percent, ** at five percent, and *** at 
one percent. 
 
We can compare the results with those from Table 1a to see relative effects of SOX on patenting by 
US and non-US residents.  The first columns show that the increase in the patenting level was much 
lower for US residents.  The second columns show that the difference is not explained by 
differences in the effect of the mean and standard deviation.  These have a statistically similar 
effect on the patenting shift for US and non-US patenters (we do not have cross-panel covariances 
from the two count panel estimates, so cannot perform formal statistical testing; neglecting the 
covariance and treating the standard errors as accurate we obtain a normal statistic of (0.00538-
0.00362)/(0.001122+0.000992)0.5 = 1.18 with a two sided p-value of 0.24 for the mean, for example).  
In the third columns we see that the establishment date explains the difference in patenting shift 
between US and non-US patenters.  For the US patenters, it has a large and significant negative 
effect which is missing from non-US patenting.  The fourth columns confirm the same distinction. 
 
Table 8: Patenting and coefficient shifts for trends between 2001/2 and 2004/5 – random effects 
estimates 
 1 2 3 4 
Time 0.0057*** 0.00569*** 0.00566*** 0.00569*** 
 0.0019 0.00189 0.0019 0.00189 
D * time 0.00636*** 0.00801*** 0.0278 0.0219 
 0.00151 0.00163 0.0219 0.0219 
D * mean * time  0.00012*** 0.0000443*** 0.000123*** 
  0.0000212 0.0000127 0.0000216 
D * s.d. * time  -0.000896***  -0.000884*** 
  0.0002  0.000201 
D * date estd. * time   -0.0000115 -0.00000717 
   0.0000113 0.0000113 
The dependent variable is the number of patents.  D is the later period dummy.  Standard errors are 
shown below the coefficients.  * denotes significance at ten percent, ** at five percent, and *** at 
one percent. 
 
Table 8 shows trend changes in patenting after SOX for non-US residents.  The first column shows 
that there is a highly significant trend increase after SOX.  Column two shows that the trend change 
is increased by in large patent classes and reduced in volatile classes, with high significance.  From 
column three we can see that the establishment date has an insignificant effect on the trend change.  
The fourth column confirms the findings from the two previous columns. 
 
By comparison with Table 2a, we can see from the first columns that the trend change for US and 
non-US patenters is similar.  However the pre-SOX trend is not significantly different from zero for 
the US patenters whereas it is significantly positive for the non-US patenters.  In columns two, we 
can compare between the US and non-US patenters the magnitudes of the base post-SOX increase 
and the effects of the patent class size and standard deviation on the trend change.  The magnitudes 
are all around twice as large for non-US patenters.  Columns three indicate that the class 
establishment date has a significant negative effect on the trend change, but only for US patenters.  
Columns four finds that the patent mean and establishment date have significant positive and 
negative effects respectively on the patenting trend for US patenters, while for non-US patenters 
the mean and standard deviation have the significant positive and negative effects. 
 
We can summarise the differences between US and non-US patenting between 2001/2 and 2004/5.  
The difference primarily arises from the highly significant reduction in US patenting for newer 
patent classes in the later period.  The difference is observable in both the level and trend change.  
This result is consistent with hypothesis H4, in that the inferred immediate post-SOX behaviour for 
newer US and non-US companies differs.  
 
5.2.2 Changes in patenting in the medium term after SOX for non-US patenters 
Table 9: Patenting and coefficient shifts for time-invariant variables between 2004/5 and 2006/7 – 
random effects estimates 
 1 2 3 4 
Time 0.00293*** 0.00294*** 0.00294*** 0.00294*** 
 0.000917 0.000917 0.000915 0.000915 
D -0.0434* -0.0451 -1.96** -1.99** 
 0.0253 0.0365 0.861 0.863 
D * mean  0.000641 -0.000151 0.000258 
  0.000895 0.000517 0.000911 
D * s.d.  -0.00281  -0.00451 
  0.00825  0.00829 
D * date estd.   0.000983** 0.001** 
   0.000442 0.000444 
The dependent variable is the number of patents.  D is the later period dummy.  Standard errors are 
shown below the coefficients.  * denotes significance at ten percent, ** at five percent, and *** at 
one percent. 
 
We now look at changes in patenting for non-US patenters between the immediate post-SOX 
period (2004/5) and the medium term (2006/7).  Table 9 shows estimates of level changes in 
patenting and their determinants between the two periods.  The first column shows the existence of 
a ten percent significant downward correction in the level.  In column two, the introduction of 
patent class size and volatility renders all level shift variables insignificant.  Column three has the 
2006/7 dummy interacted with the patent mean and establishment date.  The effect of the mean is 
insignificant, while later established patent classes have a smaller decline.  In column four we see a 
similar outcome when the mean, standard deviation, and establishment date are all included.  Only 
the establishment date has a significant effect on the patenting level change, and the effect is 
positive. 
 
By comparison with US resident patenting in Table 3a, the first columns demonstrate no significant 
difference between the within class downward shift in patenting between 2004/5 and 2006/7.  The 
second columns show that the patent class mean and standard deviation both had insignificant 
impacts for US and non-US patenters, while the third columns show that the shifts were explained 
for both patenters by establishment date with no explanatory power from the mean.  Moreover, the 
effect of the establishment date on the medium term effect is almost the same for both US and non-
US residents.  Column four confirms the same findings, with no significant effect of volatility on 
the patenting level shift. 
 
Table 10: Patenting and coefficient shifts for trends between 2004/5 and 2006/7 – random effects 
estimates 
 1 2 3 4 
Time 0.00248** 0.00249** 0.00249** 0.00249** 
 0.00109 0.00109 0.00109 0.00109 
D * time -0.000394 -0.000404 -0.0266** -0.0271** 
 0.000428 0.000569 0.0123 0.0123 
D * mean * time  0.00000935 -0.00000198 0.00000415 
  0.0000128 0.00000739 0.000013 
D * s.d. * time  -0.000044  -0.0000677 
  0.000117  0.000118 
D * date estd. * time   0.0000134** 0.0000137** 
   0.0000063 0.00000633 
The dependent variable is the number of patents.  D is the later period dummy.  Standard errors are 
shown below the coefficients.  * denotes significance at ten percent, ** at five percent, and *** at 
one percent. 
 
Table 10 shows changes in patent trends between 2004/5 and 2006/7 for non-US residents.  The 
first column indicates that there is no significant change in the trend between the two periods in the 
absence of other covariates.  The second column introduces class size and standard deviation as 
determinants of the trend change.  Both are entirely insignificant.  In column three, the class size 
and establishment date are interacted with the 2006/7 dummy.  The dummy itself becomes negative 
and significant at five percent.  The mean is insignificant in its effect, but the later established 
classes are found to have a lower patent decline with five percent significance.  From column four, 
we can see the same findings when mean, standard deviation, and establishment date are all 
interacted. 
 
Comparison with Table 4a is informative about the relative trend changes for US and non-US 
patenters.  The first columns show a slight decline in the trends of within class patenting in 2006/7.  
However, it is only ten percent significant for US patenters and insignificant for non-US patenters.  
The second columns indicate that the mean and standard deviation did not affect the trend changes 
significantly for either patenters.  For the third columns we see that the trend change was negative, 
but the decline was less for later established classes.  The magnitudes of the effects were very 
similar for US and non-US residents.  The fourth columns confirm the comparative results. 
 
In summary of the findings, for both US and non-US patenters the establishment date for the patent 
class is the only significant determinant of the patent change between 2004/5 and 2006/7.  Later 
established classes have an increased patent change (or reduced decline) between the two periods.  
However, for smaller and riskier classes there are upwards corrections for US patenters which are 
close to significance, whereas for non-US patenters these corrections are not demonstrated with 
numerical or statistical significance.  Thus, we find further evidence in support of hypothesis H4, 
that the inferred behaviour of US and non-US patenters differs in the medium term after SOX. 
 
5.2.3 Changes in patenting between the pre-SOX period and the medium term for non-US patenters 
Table 11: Patenting and coefficient shifts for time-invariant variables between 2001/2 and 2006/7 – 
random effects estimates 
 1 2 3 4 
Time 0.00785*** 0.00784*** 0.00784*** 0.00784*** 
 0.00107 0.00107 0.00107 0.00106 
D 0.0954 0.17** -1.49 -1.81* 
 0.0649 0.0715 1.04 1.04 
D * mean  0.00589*** 0.00159*** 0.0055*** 
  0.001 0.000596 0.00102 
D * s.d.  -0.0428***  -0.0445*** 
  0.0095  0.00956 
D * date estd.   0.000788 0.00102* 
   0.000531 0.000533 
The dependent variable is the number of patents.  D is the later period dummy.  Standard errors are 
shown below the coefficients.  * denotes significance at ten percent, ** at five percent, and *** at 
one percent. 
 
Table 11 shows the changes in the level of patenting between the pre-SOX period (2001/2) and the 
medium term after SOX (2006/7) for non-US patenters.  The first column shows that there was a 
statistically insignificant upward shift in the later period.  The second column finds that larger 
classes had more patenting increase and more volatile classes had less.  Both are one percent 
significant.  In column three the patent mean and establishment date are interacted with the 2006/7 
dummy.   The large classes have a greater patent increase with one percent significance, while the 
newer classes also have a larger increase but without significance.  In the fourth column the mean 
increases the patent increase, the standard deviation reduces it, and the establishment date raises it.  
All are significant (at one, one, and ten percent). 
 
We can compare with the patenting changes by US residents in Table 5a.  Columns one indicate 
that there was no significant shift in patenting in the second period in the absence of the covariates.  
From columns two we see that the larger classes increase patenting for both US and non-US 
residents.  Greater volatility reduces patenting, but the effect is only significant for non-US 
residents.  Columns three show that later establishment dates reduce patenting for US residents but 
increase it for non-US residents.  Only the reduction is statistically significant.  The fourth column 
finds that class size has a common positive effect, volatility has a significant negative effect for 
non-US residents only, and the establishment date significantly reduces US patenting and 
significantly increases non-US patenting. 
 
Table 12: Patenting and coefficient shifts for trends between 2001/2 and 2006/7 – random effects 
estimates 
 1 2 3 4 
Time 0.0114*** 0.0113*** 0.0114*** 0.0113*** 
 0.00196 0.00195 0.00195 0.00195 
D * time -0.00171 -0.000648 -0.0222 -0.0267* 
 0.00166 0.00171 0.0146 0.0146 
D * mean * time  0.0000813*** 0.0000222*** 0.0000763*** 
  0.0000141 0.00000839 0.0000144 
D * s.d. * time  -0.000593***  -0.000616*** 
  0.000134  0.000135 
D * date estd. * time   0.0000102 0.0000135* 
   0.00000746 0.00000749 
The dependent variable is the number of patents.  D is the later period dummy.  Standard errors are 
shown below the coefficients.  * denotes significance at ten percent, ** at five percent, and *** at 
one percent. 
 
Table 12 examines non-US resident patenting trend changes in the medium term after SOX 
compared with the pre-SOX period.  The first column shows that the trend fell within classes in 
2006/7, but the decline is not significant.  From the second column we can see that the patent mean 
increases the trend change, while patent volatility decreases it.  Both are highly significant.  The 
third column looks at the mean and establishment date as influences on the trend change.  Larger 
companies and newer companies both have a greater trend change, with the former effect 
significant at one percent but the latter effect insignificant.  The fourth columns shows that when 
considered together, size increases trend change, volatility decreases it, and newness increases it.  
All are significant (at one percent, one percent, and ten percent). 
 
By comparison with US resident patenting in Table 6a, we see from the first columns that trends in 
US resident patenting tend to increase significantly between the two periods within classes, while 
trends for non-US resident patenting tend to fall but without significance.  Columns two show that 
the trend change is greater for larger classes.  It is smaller for more volatile classes, but only 
significantly so for non-US residents.  From columns three, the trend change is again bigger for 
larger classes.  Newer classes have significantly reduced trend changes for US residents, but they 
have insignificantly higher trend changes for non-US residents.  The fourth columns show that size 
significantly increases the trend change and volatility reduces it.  Newness significantly lowers the 
trend change for US companies, and significantly increases it for non-US companies. 
 
We can summarise the findings from Tables 11 and 12.  Larger classes tended to have an increased 
patent change between 2001/2 and 2006/7, for patents from both US and non-US residents.  More 
volatile classes tended to have a reduced (or negative) change for both sources.  Newer classes had 
a reduced (or negative) change for US residents’ patenting, but an increased change for non-US 
residents.  As there was a differential effect of newness between US and non-US residents, we find 
evidence in support of hypothesis H4 that their behaviour differs in the medium term after SOX. 
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper has examined the dynamic effects of SOX on innovation by US companies.  We 
presented a model showing investors will reduce their investment in smaller, riskier, and newer 
companies in the immediate period after SOX and increase it subsequently due to the creation of 
real option value from waiting.  Empirical data on patenting by US residents shows behaviour 
consistent with our model, and non-US residents do not show such behaviour indicating that a US 
explanation, such as SOX, is most plausible.  A reduction in patenting for these residents persists in 
the medium term. 
 
The approach adopted in this paper indicates general patenting patterns, affected parties, and US 
specificity all consistent with SOX as a cause.  The results moreover show coherence with other 
econometric studies and corporate surveys.  There remain other possible causes.  Bargeron et al 
(2010) briefly consider and reject as explanations US economic weakness, stock price decline, 
business environment uncertainty, and an accounting regulation change on stock options.  Waters 
(2013) examines and rejects six non-SOX causes as explanations for a downturn in patenting in 
stem cell technologies.  Another possibility is that the medium term patenting recovery was due to 
SOX cost reforms rather than information disclosure.  A difficulty arises with separating the two 
effects in that SOX reforms were often clarification (Gao et al, 2009; Kamar et al, 2007) and 
involved simultaneous reduction in expenses and uncertainty (see for example a trade body’s 
response to reform at Biotechnology Industry Organization, 2007a).  An alternative explanation for 
the observed patenting variation is that other, non-SOX regulatory and judicial changes were 
responsible.  As these were often coincident with SOX and acted through similar mechanisms, 
separating the relative effects is problematic (Kamar et al, 2007, p24 and footnote 26). 
 
We have taken the period 2006-7 to be relatively free of uncertainty about SOX’s effect.  However, 
substantial guidance was still being issued during the period (Kamar et al, 2007), trade bodies were 
reporting lack of SOX clarity (Biotechnology Industry Organization, 2007a), and many directors 
and officers remained uncertain about its effects (Hartman, 2007).  It is difficult to use our 
aggregated data beyond 2007 to infer SOX effects because of the impact of the 2008-9 financial 
crisis (Paunov, 2012), and more detailed data would help with identifying SOX effects that persist 
after 2007. 
 
Our work suggests that uncertainty was responsible for part of the decline in innovation outputs 
immediately after SOX.  A policy implication is that companies should be kept informed about 
disclosure regulation costs and implementation details, particularly for businesses that would have 
the highest SOX costs relative to their size.  This would mitigate the decline due to cost uncertainty, 
but would not change the decline due to disclosure’s creation of a real option value for waiting.  
The real option value may be changed by varying the level and incidence of costs, and the speed of 
implementation.  Investigation of such policy changes could form the basis of future work. 
 
We have determined a medium term decline in patenting after SOX for smaller, riskier, and newer 
industrial classes.  Assuming that performance in the 2006/7 period can be considered as 
representing SOX’s persistent effect, it would seem that investors have shifted against investment 
in these classes.  If investment prior to SOX was efficient and made by fully informed investors, 
then SOX would be an inefficient intervention in the market for these industrial segments and a 
policy implication would be that smaller, riskier, and newer companies should have their SOX 
costs reduced.  If investment prior to SOX was inefficient, then an explicit regulatory metric 
connecting investor safeguards and corporate performance could be established to determine the 
relative efficiency of the market before and after SOX. 
 
A final implication relates to the analysis of SOX.  Most research treats the post-SOX era as subject 
to a homogeneous effect from it.  Our research shows that the effect is dynamic, and immediate 
corporate performance is likely to be influenced by SOX’s creation of real option value for 
investment delay.  Analysis of SOX’s costs and benefits in the immediate post-SOX period that 
attributes them to a persistent effect is misleading and probably too pessimistic.  SOX’s persistent 
effects should be examined at later dates instead. 
 
Appendix 1. 
Table A1: Patent classes selected 
Class Description 
28 Textiles: manufacturing 
30 Cutlery 
36 Boots, shoes, and leggings 
38 Textiles: ironing or smoothing 
42 Firearms 
48 Gas: heating and illuminating 
56 Harvesters 
62 Refrigeration 
63 Jewelry 
65 Glass manufacturing 
74 Machine element or mechanism 
86 Ammunition and explosive-charge making 
91 Motors: expansible chamber type 
102 Ammunition and explosives 
122 Liquid heaters and vaporizers 
147 Coopering 
168 Farriery 
171 Unearthing plants or buried objects 
181 Acoustics 
184 Lubrication 
186 Merchandising 
193 Conveyors, chutes, skids, guides, and ways 
208 Mineral oils: processes and products 
216 Etching a substrate: processes 
221 Article dispensing 
227 Elongated-member-driving apparatus 
235 Registers 
244 Aeronautics and astronautics 
260 Chemistry of carbon compounds 
267 Spring devices 
270 Sheet-material associating 
283 Printed matter 
290 Prime-mover dynamo plants 
293 Vehicle fenders 
 
Table A1 (continued): Patent classes selected 
Class Description 
307 Electrical transmission or interconnection systems 
322 Electricity: single generator systems 
323 Electricity: power supply or regulation systems 
355 Photocopying 
373 Industrial electric heating furnaces 
374 Thermal measuring and testing 
400 Typewriting machines 
406 Conveyors: fluid current 
412 Bookbinding: process and apparatus 
431 Combustion 
432 Heating 
441 Buoys, rafts, and aquatic devices 
472 Amusement devices 
503 
Record receiver having plural interactive leaves or a colorless color former, 
method of use, or developer therefor 
508 
Solid anti-friction devices, materials therefor, lubricant or separant 
compositions for moving solid surfaces, and miscellaneous mineral oil 
compositions 
518 
Chemistry: fischer-tropsch processes; or purification or recovery of products 
thereof 
524 Synthetic resins or natural rubbers -- part of the class 520 series 
532 Organic compounds -- part of the class 532-570 series 
600 Surgery 
606 Surgery 
623 
Prosthesis (i.e., artificial body members), parts thereof, or aids and accessories 
therefor 
700 Data processing: generic control systems or specific applications 
706 Data processing: artificial intelligence 
707 Data processing: database and file management or data structures 
800 
Multicellular living organisms and unmodified parts thereof and related 
processes 
902 Electronic funds transfer 
968 Horology 
976 Nuclear technology 
D11 Jewelry, symbolic insignia, and ornaments 
D14 Recording, communication, or information retrieval equipment 
D27 Tobacco and smokers' supplies 
D99 Miscellaneous 
PLT Plants 
Table A2: Patent classes summary for US and non-US patenters 
  US  Non-US  
Class Estd Mean SD Mean SD 
28 1922 3.5 2.0 3.1 2.0 
30 1937 18.1 5.2 17.2 3.4 
36 1900 16.8 3.3 11.6 4.6 
38 1936 0.8 1.2 1.5 1.2 
42 1902 8.5 3.3 3.1 1.7 
48 1903 3.8 2.0 3.2 2.1 
56 1919 12.8 3.9 6.6 3.3 
62 1958 33.9 6.1 31.2 7.6 
63 1908 4.6 3.6 1.6 1.1 
65 1962 18.1 8.6 18.1 6.6 
74 1934 20.2 4.3 38.4 10.0 
86 1901 0.8 0.8 0.1 0.3 
91 1963 4.1 1.9 4.7 2.2 
102 1902 7.9 2.6 6.8 3.1 
122 1911 2.4 1.2 2.5 1.6 
147 1899 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
168 1906 0.8 0.8 0.1 0.3 
171 1957 0.3 0.5 0.8 2.1 
181 1900 9.0 3.2 8.6 2.9 
184 1907 4.4 2.5 3.8 1.5 
186 1909 1.0 1.0 0.5 0.5 
193 1922 1.3 1.1 0.4 0.7 
208 1958 14.2 5.1 6.5 2.5 
216 1995 25.2 6.9 18.8 4.5 
221 1954 12.7 4.1 4.9 1.9 
227 1965 5.2 1.9 4.9 2.7 
235 1901 41.3 8.3 25.0 4.3 
244 1936 21.6 7.1 11.7 4.9 
260 1938 0.3 0.6 0.0 0.0 
267 1919 7.6 2.6 11.8 2.8 
270 1916 1.8 1.2 2.3 1.4 
283 1918 10.5 4.1 3.5 2.2 
290 1918 8.4 3.6 5.6 2.2 
293 1918 2.5 1.7 2.0 1.8 
 
Table A2 (continued): Patent classes summary for US and non-US patenters 
  US  Non-US  
Class Estd Mean SD Mean SD 
307 1952 16.5 3.3 13.2 2.8 
322 1947 1.8 0.8 3.3 2.8 
323 1947 10.1 2.8 15.6 6.0 
355 1968 9.3 3.5 21.7 5.3 
373 1982 1.0 0.7 1.8 2.2 
374 1982 14.9 3.8 12.8 5.2 
400 1978 10.8 3.4 14.6 3.3 
406 1979 2.8 1.7 0.9 0.9 
412 1982 1.4 1.2 1.5 1.9 
431 1968 13.0 2.2 8.0 3.7 
432 1972 3.5 2.2 7.3 4.3 
441 1982 5.3 2.1 2.1 1.3 
472 1992 3.2 2.0 1.4 1.4 
503 1987 1.5 1.4 5.2 2.4 
508 1996 8.1 2.8 6.2 2.9 
518 1981 4.8 1.6 1.8 1.1 
524 1982 63.0 9.5 61.5 9.8 
532 1984 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
600 1988 144.0 17.5 68.4 7.4 
606 1989 166.2 23.7 36.3 7.7 
623 1985 85.8 15.7 19.3 3.8 
700 1999 67.1 13.0 47.0 8.2 
706 1998 18.8 8.0 8.6 3.9 
707 1997 283.5 41.6 120.3 12.4 
800 1986 77.9 11.3 20.6 4.5 
902 1988 0.4 0.7 0.2 0.6 
968 1992 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
976 1991 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.3 
D11 1976 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.0 
D14 1976 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.3 
D27 1975 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
D99 1967 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
PLT 1963 14.1 7.1 23.7 9.5 
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